What is a higher order desire?
Higher-order volitions (or higher-order desire), as opposed to action-determining volitions, are volitions about volitions. Examples would be desires to want to own a new car; to want to meet the pope; or to want to quit drinking alcohol permanently.
What is the difference between a second order desire and a second order volition?
second-order desire: a desire to have a certain desire. A desire that I should desire celery rather than potato chips is an example of a second-order desire. second-order volition: a desire that a certain desire be one’s will, i.e., a desire that a certain desire bring one to action.
What is the difference between a first order desire and a second order desire?
A first order desire is a desire for anything other than a desire; a second order desire is a desire for a desire. So, for instance, you might have a first order desire to smoke a cigarette; and a second order desire that you desire not to smoke a cigarette.
Is Harry Frankfurt a Compatibilist?
Harry Frankfurt is a prominent defender of a compatibilist view of free will.
What is an effective first order desire?
The distinction of interest is that between first order desires which are not effective–i.e., those which do not end up motivating action–and first order desires which are effective–i.e., those which do end up motivating action.
What are Frankfurt cases meant to illustrate?
Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.
What does Frankfurt say about free will?
Frankfurt states, “A person may do something in circumstances that leave [him] no alterna- tive to doing it, without these circumstances actually moving him or leading him to do it- -without them playing any role, indeed, in bringing it about that he does what he does” (160).
What makes a person Frankfurt?
Frankfurt argues that the difference between a person and an animal (human or otherwise) which is not a person is a difference in the structure of will. Frankfurt notes that humans have a characteristic other animals do not: Human persons can form desires for and against particular desires for and against actions.
Do Libertarians believe in free will?
Libertarians believe that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, and agents have free will. They therefore deny that causal determinism is true. Non-causal libertarians typically believe that free actions are constituted by basic mental actions, such as a decision or choice. …
What does Harry Frankfurt argue?
What does Frankfurt say is required for moral responsibility?
Frankfurt 1969): Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Although its precise form and interpretation have varied, this principle has enjoyed broad support in the history of philosophy.